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Abstract. The principle of proportionate causality is often cited as a cause for concern 
that Thomistic metaphysics may be irreconcilable with a theory of biological evolution. 
St. Thomas does hold that for the generation of what he calls perfect animals, a gener-
ator of the same species is required. This study clarifies what the proportionate causes 
of generated organisms are for Thomas, examining his views about spontaneous gen-
eration, reproductive generation, and hybridization, while also articulating the roles of 
both the heavenly bodies and their separate movers as universal causes of generation. 
This study establishes that Thomas’s assertion of the need for a univocal generator for 
perfect animals is grounded not in the principle of proportionate causality, but rather in 
physical and biological doctrines received from Aristotle and in a causal principle that 
seems reconcilable with biological evolution, namely, that a remote universal cause 
requires more mediating causes to produce more powerful effects.
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Introduction
It is a frequently cited principle within the works of St. Thomas Aquinas 
that an effect cannot “exceed” its cause (SCG 1.67; ST 2–2.24.6 s.c.; De pot. 
3.16 ad 8.), that an effect cannot be “more powerful” than its cause (In Sent. 
4.23.2.2 qc. 1 ad 3; SCG 1.41, 3.120; ST 1.95.1, 1–2.66.1; De spir. creat. 11 ad 
11), that an effect cannot be more perfect than its cause (ST 1–2.63.2 obj. 
3).1 In numerous texts, Thomas also asserts that “nothing acts beyond its 
species” (In Sent. 2.18.2.3; De ver. 24.14; Quodl. 9.5.1; SCG 3.84; De pot. 3.9; 
ST 1–2.112.1), often indicating that this is so because no effect can be more 
powerful than its agent cause (In Sent. 2.18.2.3 obj. 3. Cf. De pot. 3.8 obj. 13; 
ST 1–2.112.1; Comp. theo. 1.93). As it is now often called, the principle of 
proportionate causality is also frequently expressed in the form that “nothing 
gives what it does not have.”2 Such a principle is, understandably, a source 
for concerns about the irreconcilability of a theory of biological evolution 
with Thomistic philosophy.3
Like Aristotle, Thomas does in fact hold that there are some animal 
species whose members can only be generated through reproduction 
by already existing members of the same species: if this is so, then the 
emergence of such animals through any natural evolutionary process is 
impossible. That horses beget horses and human beings beget human 
1 I offer my thanks to the Thomistic Evolution project, led by Nicanor Austriaco, O.P., with 
funding from the John Templeton Foundation, for opportunities to present and discuss 
earlier versions of this study and for support that made research for this project possible. 
I also owe my gratitude to David Cory, Brandon Zimmerman, Philip Neri Reese, O.P., Rob-
ert C. Koons, Daniel De Haan, Mariusz Tabaczek, O.P., Nicanor Austriaco, O.P., Richard 
Conrad, O.P., Raymond Hain, and Elliot Polsky for helpful comments and feedback.
2 This formulation only appears explicitly in Thomas’s writings in objections. See e.g. In 
Sent. 4.15.2.6 qc. 1 obj. 2; ST 1–2.81.3 obj. 2, 3.64.5 obj. 1. See first section below for 
discussion. Alternatively, as a character in a story by Ralph McInerny memorably puts 
it, “Nemo dat quod non got.” See Ralph McInerny, The Prudence of the Flesh (St. Martin’s 
Press: New York, 2006), 231.
3 Fr. Michael Chaberek has pointed to the principles that “no being can convey more act 
than it possesses,” that “no effect can exceed the power of its cause” and that “the perfec-
tion of the cause cannot be lesser than the perfection of the effect” as incompatible with 
the evolutionary emergence of novel genera of living things. See Aquinas on Evolution 
(The Chartwell Press: 2017), 48; “Classical Metaphysics and Theistic Evolution: Why are 
They Incompatible?” Studia Gilsoniana 8.1 (2019): 56.
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beings might seem to be the most obvious application of the principle that 
“nothing gives what it does not have,” that the actuality in an effect must 
be preceded by the same actuality in the cause: this is in fact the sort of 
example given by Aristotle in Metaphysics 9 in his discussion of the temporal 
priority of actuality in the universe, even if potentiality precedes actuality 
in the individual (Metaphysics 9.8).
As Aristotle’s discussions of the generation of living substances (both 
in Metaphysics 7 and in his biological works) indicate, however, matters are 
somewhat more complicated, given his commitment to the claim that some 
living things are spontaneously generated, like flies from rotting flesh or 
oysters from slimy mud. It cannot be that in Aristotle or Thomas’s mind 
the requirement for a generator of the same species, in cases like the horse 
or the human being, is simply a consequence of a general principle that 
“something cannot give what it does not have;” otherwise, spontaneous 
generation would seem to be ruled out. Matters are similarly complicated 
by Aristotle’s discussion of another topic in the same texts, namely, animals 
that arise from hybridization, such as the mule, the offspring of a horse and 
a donkey. There is little hope of fully understanding Aristotle’s assertion of 
the temporal priority of actuality or Thomas’s principle that an effect cannot 
exceed its cause without an examination of their views about spontaneous 
generation and hybridization. I would propose that it is necessary to 
understand something of their biological and cosmological views in these 
cases, which are presumably consistent with their metaphysical principles, 
if one wishes to raise the question of how their principles might bear on 
the contemporary question of biological evolution.
This study will examine the notion of “proportionate causality” as 
discussed by Thomas, followed by an examination of what the proportionate 
causes are for Thomas (and for Aristotle, insofar as Thomas follows him) 
of spontaneously generated animals and of reproduced animals, including 
hybrids like the mule. This will allow us to clarify why Thomas holds that 
some animals can only arise through reproductive univocal generation. I will 
show that Thomas does not reach this conclusion merely by reasoning from 
something like the principle of proportionate causality. Rather, Thomas’s 
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reasons for asserting the need in some cases for a generator of the same 
species (a univocal generator) are grounded in physical and biological 
doctrines that he receives from Aristotle and in his understanding of the 
causal hierarchy in which changes in the sublunary depend upon the motions 
of the celestial bodies.
I will show that Thomas’s understanding of the role of instrumental 
causality in univocal reproductive generation should undercut any use of 
the principle of proportionate causality to argue that biological evolution 
is irreconcilable with Thomas’s metaphysical principles. In brief, Thomas 
does not in fact hold that any individual animal “has” its own nature in 
such a way that it is sufficient to “give” that nature to something else, for 
on his view an individual animal is an instrumental cause in the generation 
of another individual of the same species. I will also document that there 
is a general principle about the causal hierarchy that Thomas invokes in 
his discussions of the need for univocal generators—that more mediating 
causes are required for the constitution of what is more perfect—but I will 
argue that this principle is far from irreconcilable with biological evolution. 
I will conclude with some suggestions about implications for the debate 
about the reconcilability of Thomistic metaphysics with biological evolution.
1. “Proportionate causality” in Thomas’s thought
Like the claim that “there is nothing in the intellect that is not first in the 
sense,” the formulation that “nothing gives what it does not have” only 
explicitly appears in Thomas’s writings in objections. As Therese Cory has 
recently shown, the formulation “there is nothing in the intellect that is not 
first in the sense” is in fact difficult to reconcile with many of the details of 
Thomas’s understanding of human intellectual knowledge about incorporeal 
realities (Cory 2018). The truth to which Thomas is committed that is at 
issue in this well-known formula—the dependence of human intellectual 
cognition upon sense cognition—is better and more precisely expressed in 
other ways. I would suggest that in a similar way the formulation “nothing 
gives what it does not have” might easily mislead when one considers 
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Thomas’s views about animal generation and the requirement for a univocal 
generator in the case of what Thomas calls perfect animals.
When Thomas’s recent interpreters who speak of the principle of 
proportionate causality offer an interpretation of what this principle means 
in practice in Thomas’s thought, they say that the principle amounts to the 
claim that something’s efficient cause must possess the form/perfection 
that it causes either by having that perfection formally (by actually having 
the same form in the same way), or by having it in a more eminent way, or 
by having it virtually, where to have it virtually is just to “have it” in such 
a way that it is able to cause it in something else (Feser 2017, 33).
Such a principle, so understood, will have some implications concerning 
something identified as an absolute first efficient cause: a first efficient 
cause of everything other than itself will have to possess all perfections at 
least virtually, and this in turn would be a reason for saying that an absolute 
first cause is superior to its effects, if it is also supposed, with Thomas, that 
virtual possession of some actuality can be a more perfect mode of possessing 
that actuality.4 But apart from this further claim, the principle that “nothing 
gives what it does not have,” in its application to a given efficient cause, 
amounts only to the claim that an efficient cause must at least be able to 
cause whatever perfection it causes, even if its ability to cause that perfection 
is not due to its own formal possession of the perfection. It turns out to be 
a principle that doesn’t tell us very much on its own.
Thomas does occasionally use the language of proportion between effects 
and causes, although typically not as a way of expressing the principle that 
an effect cannot exceed its cause.5 In several cases where Thomas speaks 
of a necessary “proportion” between effects and causes, he says (1) that per 
se effects are proportioned to per se causes, while per accidens effects are 
proportioned to per accidens causes (In Meta. 6.2.) and (2) that particular 
4 ST 1.4.2: “Manifestum est enim quod effectus praeexistit virtute in causa agente, prae-
existere autem in virtute causae agentis, non est praeexistere imperfectiori modo, sed 
perfectiori.”
5 In one text he does offer as a principle that an effect must be proportionate to its cause: 
he argues that there must be something infinite about the object of supernatural hope, 
because it is caused by the infinite helping power of God. ST 2–2.17.2.
8(2)/2020228
B R I A N T. CA R L
effects are proportioned to particular causes, while universal effects are 
proportioned to universal causes (De ver. 2.5; De sub. sep. 10; SCG 2.21).6 As 
we will see below, the distinctions between per se and per accidens causes 
and between universal and particular causes are both centrally involved 
in Thomas’s account of the generation of living things, along with the 
distinction between principal and instrumental causality. As noted above, 
Thomas does with some frequency assert that an effect cannot exceed or 
be more powerful than its cause, but he recognizes that such a restriction 
does not apply to the relationship between instrumental causes and their 
effects.7 He adds this same qualification to his claim that nothing acts 
outside of its species.8
2. Thomas on novel species after the sixth day: on the mule
Before turning to some of the details of Thomas’s understanding of the 
proportionate causes of the species of living things, I want to make clear that 
consideration of such topics as spontaneous generation and hybridization 
will be directly relevant to thinking about the reconcilability of biological 
evolution with Thomistic metaphysics. In articulating his interpretation 
of the first book of Genesis in the Summa theologiae, Thomas considers the 
question of whether the work of creation is truly complete on the seventh 
day. The third objection in this article notes that many things of new species 
6 In the last of these texts, St. Thomas also asserts that potential effects are proportioned 
to potential causes, while actual effects are proportioned to actual causes. These claims 
about the necessary proportions between effects and causes are ultimately indebted to 
Aristotle’s discussion of the modes of causality in Physics 2.3 and to a claim made by Ar-
istotle at the conclusion of this chapter. See In Phys. 2.6 #197: “Et est, quod causis debent 
proportionaliter respondere effectus, ita quod generalibus causis generales effectus red-
dantur, et singularibus singulares; puta, si dicatur quod statuae causa est statuam faciens, 
et huius statuae hic statuam faciens. Et similiter causis in potentia respondent effectus in 
potentia, et causis in actu effectus in actu.”
7 ST 3.79.2 ad 3: “Nihil autem prohibet causam instrumentalem producere potiorem effec-
tum, ut ex supra dictis patet.”
8 In Sent. 4.12.1.2 qc. 2 ad 2: “Ad secundum dicendum, quod propria virtute nihil agit ultra 
suam speciem: sed virtute alterius, cujus est instrumentum, potest agere ultra speciem 
suam, sicut serra agit ad formam scamni.”
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appear even today, through spontaneous generation—this is the view of 
Aristotle. In Thomas’s reply, he points both to spontaneous generation and 
hybridization as possible sources of novel species (ST 1.73.1 ad 3):
Nothing entirely new was afterwards [i.e., after the seventh day] made by God; 
rather, [all things] in some way preceded [as already made] in the works of the six 
days.[…] Also new species, if these appear, preexisted in certain active powers, 
just as animals generated from putrefaction are produced by the powers of the 
stars [i.e., the heavenly bodies] and of the elements, which [powers] they received 
at the beginning, if new species of such animals should also be produced. Certain 
animals of a new species sometimes also arise from the connection of animals 
of diverse species, as when from a donkey and a horse there is generated a mule, 
and this [species] too previously existed causally in the works of the six days.
The question might be raised, concerning this text, as to whether the mule 
is in fact a distinct species of animal, in Thomas’s or Aristotle’s mind. In 
some well-known remarks about mules in Metaphysics 7, Aristotle indicates 
that although the mule is neither a horse nor a donkey, it is nevertheless of 
the same genus as its parents, as a “beast of burden.” Some interpreters fill 
in the gaps in a way that would deny that the mule is a genuine species, by 
suggesting that the mule is somehow an imperfect member of a genus but 
not a member of a genuine species. This is not what Aristotle says, however, 
and it would seem impossible to square with Aristotle’s understanding of 
genera and species to suppose that some individual could exist which was 
merely of a genus without belonging to a species.9
About this point, in any event, Thomas asserts plainly in another text 
from the De potentia that the mule is of a species distinct from both the 
horse and the donkey, a species as it were in the middle between them (De 
pot. 3.8 ad 16). Thomas’s position in ST 1.73.1 ad 3 is clear: there can be 
new species of living things that emerge after the work of the six days, so 
long as they can be said to be present in the active powers of things already 
created. That is, there must exist created things capable of causing their 
9 See De anima 2.3.
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generation. Although this text concerning the seven days of creation is 
theological in character insofar as it expresses Thomas’s interpretation 
of the creation narrative in Genesis 1, the view that novel species might 
arise from the active powers of already existent natural agents is strictly 
philosophical in character.
With respect to the mule, some interpreters also assume that Aristotle 
thinks that the mule is sterile simply because it is generated through hy-
bridization and that its sterility is a consequence and sign of its imperfection 
or its failure to be of a genuine species. Aristotle discusses the mule at 
some length in De generatione animalium 2.7–8. We do in fact find in c. 8 
an argument along the lines just suggested. In attempting to explain the 
sterility of mules, Aristotle suggests as what he calls an “abstract” and 
“general” proof of the sterility of mules that perhaps their sterility is due 
simply to the fact that the mule arises from the copulation of two animals 
different in species and is different in kind from each of its parents.
Immediately after presenting this apparent proof, however, Aristotle 
proceeds to say that “this account is too general and empty, since theories 
not based on the appropriate principles are empty, appearing to be connected 
with the facts without really being so.[…] The basis of this particular account 
is not true, for many animals produced from different species are fertile, as 
was said before.”10 Aristotle has in fact listed numerous fertile hybrids of 
which he is aware earlier in the De generatione, and he has claimed that, as 
far as he knows, the mule alone is sterile among hybrid animals. Why then 
is this particular species sterile, on Aristotle’s view? He proceeds to suggest 
that it has to do with the limited fecundity of the horse and the donkey. Each 
species typically gives birth to singletons; it often takes repeated mating for 
conception to occur; the donkey is of a colder nature than most quadrupeds; 
and the mare produces less menstrual blood than most female animals. 
That a colder nature makes for lower fertility is because Aristotle thinks 
that semen causes the generation of a new animal through vital heat, and 
he thinks that menstrual blood is the matter from which the new animal 
10 De gen. anim. 2.8 748a8–13 [Barnes 1160].
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is formed. Putting all of these factors together, Aristotle tells us that when 
a cross breeding contrary to nature “is added to the difficulty they have in 
producing a single one when united with their own species, the result of the 
cross breeding […] will need nothing further to make it sterile.”11 Aristotle’s 
fascination with the mule is not because it is not of a genuine species; it 
is rather that there should exist any genuine species that is nevertheless 
by its nature sterile. But the explanation is to be found, he thinks, not in 
an abstract principle, but in the natures of the horse and the donkey from 
which the mule is descended.
3. Reproduction and spontaneous generation in Aristotle
The Aristotelian theory of animal generation—and Thomas’s reception and 
understanding of that theory—cannot be properly understood apart from 
the Aristotelian cosmology and elemental theory. Aristotle conceives of 
the cosmos as a concentric series of incorruptible celestial spheres rotating 
eternally around the earth. The lowest of these spheres is that bearing the 
moon; everything below that sphere is made of the four simple, elemental 
bodies of earth, air, fire, and water, the simple bodies making up the sorts 
of physical substances that are subject to generation and corruption. The 
celestial spheres are, by contrast, incorruptible, and so must be not be 
composed of these simple bodies; the matter of the heavenly spheres is 
subject only to rotational locomotion and to no other sort of change.
The four elemental bodies in the sublunary are understood by Aristotle 
fundamentally in terms of certain active and passive qualities—heat, cold-
ness, moisture, and dryness—and each of his elemental bodies combines 
a pair of these contrary qualities, as fire is the hot and dry, water is the cold 
and wet, and so on. The celestial spheres, and in particular that bearing 
the sun, are causes of heat in the sublunary: the sun heats the sublunary 
as its sphere rotates around the earth. The dependence of all substantial 
generation and corruption in the sublunary domain upon the rotation of the 
11 De gen. anim. 2.8 748b16–19 [Barnes 1161].
8(2)/2020232
B R I A N T. CA R L
heavenly spheres is grounded in the claim that the primary active quality 
in all sublunary substances is heat, which is caused in the sublunary by the 
sun. In what follows, I will briefly present some basic theses from Aristotle’s 
understanding of animal generation that are appropriated by Thomas.12
On the Aristotelian theory of the generation of living things, it is 
through heat that matter is qualitatively disposed to the generation of 
the new living substance, just as it is also through heat that an individual 
animal digests and assimilates food into itself, through the hot blood that 
is concocted from food. In the case of reproduction among animals, the 
semen that comes from the father is itself concocted, purified blood (De 
gen. anim. 1.18 726a26, 1.19 726b2–12). The close relation between blood 
and semen in Aristotle’s theory of reproduction is important to note: blood 
is that through which the animal ultimately assimilates nutrient into itself, 
growing and healing by generating its homogeneous parts, such as flesh 
and bone, in an organized fashion; semen is thoroughly concocted blood, 
endowed with a power similar to blood (a power to produce such things as 
flesh), but ordered to doing so in the conception of a new individual, from 
the matter provided by the female (De gen. anim. 2.4 740b24). As Thomas 
puts it, the semen has a “formative virtue” derived from the soul of the 
parent (ST 1.71 ad 1; De pot. 3.9 ad 16).
Aristotle compares the semen to the tool of a carpenter, endowed with 
the movements given by the carpenter, as if a tool could be endowed by 
a carpenter with a tendency to move in the way necessary to form a table, 
even once separated from the hands of the carpenter (De gen. anim. 1.22 
730b9–24). But whereas the saw’s movements are locomotions, semen 
acts through qualitative alteration, by heating in a structured way.13 And 
just as the saw does not become part of the table, so too Aristotle thinks 
12 I am indebted to James Lennox, “Aristotle’s Theory of Spontaneous Generation,” in Aris-
totle’s Philosophy of Biology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 229–49, esp. 
230–33; and to Daryn Lehoux, Creatures Born of Mud and Slime (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2017), 13–31.
13 This is not to preclude cases in which human artifice involves qualitative alteration or 
even produces a substantial change. See the latter part of section 6 below for bread-bak-
ing as an example of an artificially produced substantial change, on St. Thomas’s view.
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of semen as an extrinsic agent that acts upon the passive matter—such as 
menstrual blood—supplied by the female.14 Just as many of the individual 
characteristics of a table would be due to the characteristics of the wood upon 
which the saw acts (perhaps even contrary to what the carpenter intends 
through the movements of his tools), so too many individual characteristics 
of the generated animal are due to and a likeness of the mother, due to her 
providing the proximate matter from which the animal is generated.
At this point, we should note that our understanding of sexual re-
production is quite different: the process of sexual reproduction is such 
that neither parent aims at a perfect copy of itself in all its individual 
characteristics, as the process is ordered per se towards some combination 
of traits of the parents or of the parents’ own ancestors. On Aristotle’s view, 
that the offspring should be anything but the spitting image of the father 
is always praeter naturam, apart from what the natural process of sexual 
reproduction intends. There is already more room for the notion of descent 
with modification on an understanding of sexual reproduction as a process 
that aims per se at a novel combination of traits.
4. Instrumental causality in Thomas’s account of generation
It is because all heat in the sublunary depends upon the activity of the 
sun that all reproductive generation also depends ultimately upon the 
sun. As Aristotle observes in Physics 2.2—and this is an observation that is 
tremendously important for Thomas—“man and the sun generate a man.” 
Thomas cites this observation frequently, and he takes it to mean that the 
sun and the individual animal are related to one another as (1) a universal, 
principal agent and (2) a particular, instrumental agent. Just as a carpenter 
might use a tool, an instrument, to produce some effect by a motion that the 
carpenter imparts to the instrument, so Thomas thinks that all generative 
activity by individual animals depends upon the heating action of the sun: 
14 For the claim that the semen does not become part of the newly generated living thing, 
see De gen. anim. 2.3 737a12.
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the sun as it were uses the individual male animal as an instrument through 
which it produces new instances of the same species.
As noted above, in asserting the need for a proportion between causes 
and effects, Thomas distinguishes between universal causes and universal 
effects and particular causes and particular effects, asserting that universal 
effects must be proportioned to universal causes. Consider the following 
from c. 10 of Thomas’s treatise De substantiis separatis:
A twofold cause is found of some nature or form: one which is per se and abso-
lutely the cause of such a nature or form; but another which is the cause of this 
nature or form in this [individual]. Indeed the necessity of this distinction is 
clear, if one considers the causes of things that are generated. For when a horse 
is generated, the generating horse is the cause that the nature of a horse begins 
to exist in this [individual], but [the generating horse] is not the per se cause of 
the nature of horse. For in order for something to be the per se cause of some 
specific nature, it is necessary that it be its cause in all things having that 
species. Since therefore the generating horse has the same specific nature, it 
would need to be its own cause, which cannot be the case. It remains therefore 
that there must be, superior to all those things participating the nature of horse, 
a universal cause of the entire species. Such a cause the Platonists held to be 
a species separate from matter, in the manner that the principle of all artificial 
things is the form in art [i.e. the artist’s knowledge], not existing in matter. But 
according to the opinion of Aristotle it is necessary to place this universal cause 
in some heavenly body: whence distinguishing these two causes, he said that 
man and the sun generate man.
In addition to the previously mentioned text from Physics 2.2, Thomas 
almost certainly has in mind here the discussion of the generation of 
living substances in Metaphysics 7, in which Aristotle rejects the theory 
of Platonic forms as causes of generation. In commenting on this part of 
Metaphysics 7, Thomas says that Aristotle intends to show, against Plato, 
that the natures and forms existing in individual sensible things need not 
be and could not be generated by forms existing outside of matter, but that 
they are generated “by forms which exist in matter” (In Meta. 7.6 #1381). 
(Here I would recall Thomas’s assertion that if novel species arise after the 
8(2)/2020 235
T H O M A S AQ U I N A S O N T H E P RO PO RT I O N AT E CA U S E S O F L I V I N G S P E C I E S
work of the six days, they do so from active powers found among already 
existent species.) Furthermore, Aristotle does not, on Thomas’s view, do away 
with a single universal cause of generation, a universal per se cause of the 
generated nature: but he places this cause too within the material universe, 
in a heavenly body, the sun. As Thomas elsewhere puts it, endorsing what 
he takes to be Aristotle’s view, “whatever causes generation in these lower 
[bodies] moves [its patient] to a species as the instrument of a heavenly 
body” (ST 1.115.3 ad 2., cf. SCG 3.69, ST 1.45.8 ad 3).
Here we come to a crucial point: it is not in fact Thomas’s view that the 
individual generating animal is on its own a sufficient agent cause of the 
generation of a new animal within its own species, since the generating 
animal depends upon its being moved by a higher agency in order to cause 
a thing’s nature. The individual animal does not have its nature, on its own, 
in such a manner that it is able to give that nature to something else; it has 
that nature in such a manner that it can be used instrumentally by a superior 
cause. It also bears repeating that on Thomas’s construal of Aristotelian 
metaphysics, against Platonic metaphysics, one needs to place the active 
causes for the generation of natural substances within the material universe. 
I will return to this latter point at the end of this study.
5. Spontaneous generation and the univocal generation  
of perfect animals
Because the vital heat through which semen generates a new animal is itself 
ultimately from the sun, Aristotle and Thomas think that the phenomenon 
of spontaneous generation can be readily explained by the activity of heat 
present in non-living matter acting upon matter that happens to have be-
come disposed in such a way that something living can be generated from it 
(such as putrefying flesh or slimy mud). There is some indeterminacy about 
what results from spontaneous generation, as what results depends upon 
how the matter happens to have been disposed, rather than upon the sort 
of structured heating by semen that aims at educing a specific form with 
certain individual traits. Animals arising by spontaneous generation arise 
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by chance, by incidental (per accidens) causation, as the proximate cause is 
not acting for the sake of producing the specific effect.
Spontaneous generation (or generation by chance) involves per acci-
dens causation, as the activity of the proximate causes is not for the sake 
of producing a specific result. Thomas explains in his Commentary on the 
Metaphysics 7.6 (In Meta. 7.6 #1403):
Nothing prohibits some generation from being per se when referred to one 
cause, which is nevertheless per accidens and by chance when referred to another 
cause, as is clear in the very example given by the Philosopher. For when health 
follows from a rubbing, outside the intention of the one rubbing, the health 
[that results], if it be referred to the nature that regulates the body, is not per 
accidens, but is intended per se. But if [the health that results] be referred to the 
mind of the one rubbing, it will be per accidens and by chance. Similarly too the 
generation of an animal generated by putrefaction, if it be referred to particular 
causes, the inferior agents, will be found to be per accidens and by chance. For 
the heat that causes decay does not intend by natural appetite the generation 
of this or that animal that arises from putrefaction in the way that the power 
which is from the semen does intend the production in a certain species. But if 
[the generation from putrefaction] be referred to the heavenly power, which is 
the universal regulative power of generations and corruptions in these inferior 
[bodies], it is not per accidens, but intended, since it is of the intention [of the 
heavenly body] that there be educed into actuality all the forms which exist in 
the potency of matter.
The “proportionate causes” of spontaneously generated organisms include, 
for Thomas, both the incidental (per accidens) proximate cause and a per se 
remote, universal cause. In the case of generation through reproduction, 
the proximate cause acts as a per se cause whose causal activity is ordered 
towards a specific result, albeit still as a particular instrument of a universal, 
principal agency.
Aristotle in fact thinks that entirely new kinds of spontaneously gener-
ated animals may arise constantly, but he also holds that no spontaneously 
generated animal successfully reproduces in kind. On this point, we en-
counter a range of views in the later Peripatetic tradition. Thomas takes up 
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this point in his commentary on Metaphysics 7, asserting (seemingly as an 
empirically observed fact) that there are species of plants that can be spon-
taneously generated and then go on to produce seed, reproducing in kind. 
This is a rather tame position compared to that of Avicenna, who (Thomas 
reports) asserts that any living species that can reproduce in kind—up to 
and including human beings—can also be produced, under the right material 
conditions, by spontaneous generation (In Meta. 7.6 #1399–1401).
Thomas, by contrast, draws the line at what he calls perfect animals. 
Plants and imperfect animals may arise by spontaneous generation, but 
the generation of perfect animals requires the instrumental contribution 
made by the animal reproducing within its species (SCG 3.69; QDdA 5). 
Where Thomas indicates what he means by “perfect animals,” he points to 
the organic complexity of higher animals in comparison to lower animals 
and plants, telling us that “perfect animals have a supreme diversity in 
their organs, but plants a minimal [diversity]” (SCG 2.72. Cf. ST 1.76.5 ad 3, 
ST 1.76.8, QDdA 10 ad 15). This is so because a perfect animal must have 
a wider range of powers, perhaps by having all of the senses (In Meta. 1.1 
#9) or more precisely by having the internal sense power of memory, in 
addition to imagination (In Meta. 1.1 #14. Cf. ST 1.78.4).
It is essential to the notion of instrumental causality that an instru-
mental cause produces an effect that exceeds its own independent power, 
by virtue of its being moved by a principal agent, as the saw used by the 
carpenter produces a bed. But it is necessary to distinguish between those 
cases of instrumental causality in which the principal agent’s own power is 
not augmented by the instrument and those cases in which the instrument 
does augment the power of the principal agent. All of the cases in which 
created agents act as instruments of divine agency are instances of the 
former sort, as a created instrumental cause never augments the power of 
the divine cause: God can produce immediately by His own power whatever 
He can also bring about through instrumental causes. But in many cases, 
a principal agent using an instrument is able to produce an effect that 
exceeds its power without the use of that instrument. Just as the tools of 
a carpenter also augment what the carpenter can accomplish through his 
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hands, so on Thomas’s view the heavenly body needs the contribution 
made by the reproducing animal in order to produce another instance of 
its species (In Meta. 7.6 #1401).
Why should the instrumental contribution made by a univocal generator 
be necessary in the case of perfect animals, whose organic complexity sur-
passes plants and imperfect animals? Given his commitment to the view that 
animals like flies are spontaneously generated from rotting flesh, it is not 
that Thomas thinks that it is beyond the power of heat from the sun to educe 
the form of an animal with powers for sensation and locomotion. Thomas 
thinks, however, that the “structured” heating accomplished by semen is 
necessary in order to account for the formation of the more complex bodies 
of higher animals. By what principle does Thomas reach this conclusion? 
Thomas asserts that “the power of a heavenly body suffices for generating 
certain less perfect animals from disposed matter, for it is obvious that 
more [things] are required for the production of a perfect thing than for the 
production of an imperfect thing” (ST 1.91.2 ad 2. Cf. In Sent. 2.18.2.3 ad 
5, De pot. 3.11 ad 12, In Meta. 7.6 #1401). This principle that “more things” 
are required for the production of what is more perfect would seem to find 
some explanation in a text from De malo 16.9, which examines a question 
which we will discuss below, namely, whether a created immaterial substance 
(or more specifically, in De malo 16.9, a demon) can cause a qualitative or 
substantial change in a bodily thing.
In addressing this question in this text, Thomas asserts that generally, 
a more remote agent—he must mean a created agent rather than the divine 
agent—produces a weaker effect immediately, while needing a mediating 
agent to produce a more powerful effect (De malo 16.9). In the same text, 
he offers the following to illustrate his point:
For we see among sensible things that a weak effect is produced by a remote 
agent, but a strong effect requires a nearby agent; for something can be heated 
by fire, even if it is remote from the fire, but it cannot be ignited unless it is 
close to the fire, so that someone who wishes to ignite a thing that is remote 
from a fire in a lit furnace accomplishes this by means of a candle. And similarly 
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the generation of perfect animals is caused by the heavenly bodies by means 
of proper active [causes], but the generation of imperfect animals [is caused 
by them] immediately.
Here I would highlight Thomas’s explanation of why the heavenly body 
needs the instrumental contribution made by the univocal generator. The 
general principle employed is not a version of the principle of propor-
tionate causality, but is instead a principle about the need for mediating 
instrumental causes in order for a created remote cause to produce a more 
powerful effect. This principle hardly seems irreconcilable with a theory of 
biological evolution.
6. Separate substances as the living, intelligent movers  
of the heavenly spheres
I have argued above that the instrumental causality of a univocal generator, 
on Thomas’s account, should impact the way in which we understand the 
applicability of a principle of proportionate causality to the generation 
of living things. There is a serious objection with which I must contend, 
however, grounded in how Thomas himself replies to a series of objections 
motivated by something like the principle of proportionate causality.
In De pot. 3.11, Thomas considers the question of whether the sensitive 
or vegetative soul is transmitted through semen in the generation of an 
animal, a question to which he gives an affirmative answer (albeit with the 
qualification, consistent with what we have seen above, that the sensitive 
and vegetative soul are in the semen virtually rather than actually). The 
twelfth objection argues, contrary to Thomas’s view, that the soul of a spon-
taneously generated animal must be created, because in this case there is no 
agent similar in species to the animal by which it might be produced; and 
so all the more, the objection insists, it must be that the souls of animals 
generated by semen must also be created. The thirteenth objection begins 
with a likely response (a sed dices) to the twelfth objection, followed by a sed 
contra (De pot. 3.11 obj. 13):
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But you will say that the sensitive soul is produced, in animals generated 
out of decay, by the power of a celestial body, just as [it is produced] in other 
[animals] by the formative power in semen. On the contrary, as Augustine says, 
a living substance is preeminent in comparison to every non-living substance. 
But a celestial body is not a living substance, since it is inanimate. Therefore 
a sensitive soul, which is a principle of life, cannot be produced by its power.
Here the counter-objection does appeal implicitly to something like the 
principle of proportionate causality. This is then followed in the fourteenth 
objection by another sed dices and sed contra (De pot. 3.11 obj. 14):
But you will say that a heavenly body can be the cause of a sensible soul, insofar 
as it acts in the power of the intellectual substance which moves it. On the 
contrary, what is received in another is in it [i.e., the recipient] in the mode of 
the recipient and not in its own mode. If therefore the power of an intellectual 
substance is received in a non-living heavenly body, it will not be [received] 
there as a vital power which can be a principle of life.
In replying to this series of objections and counter-objections, Thomas 
begins by citing the principle we have already discussed, that “the more 
imperfect something is, the fewer are [the things] required for its consti-
tution” (De pot. 3.11 ad 12). The power of a heavenly body is sufficient to 
produce the sensitive soul in an imperfect animal, but the heavenly body 
needs the contribution made by the reproducing animal in the case of 
perfect animals. Even though the heavenly body is not like in species to 
a spontaneously generated animal, “there is nevertheless a likeness insofar 
as the effect preexists virtually in [its] active cause” (De pot. 3.11 ad 12). So 
far, this is consistent with what we have said above.
In replying to the thirteenth objection and counter-objection, which had 
raised the concern that a heavenly body cannot be the cause of something 
living, because it is not itself living, Thomas replies by noting that “even 
if a heavenly body is not alive, it nevertheless acts in the power of the 
living substance by which it is moved, whether this be an angel or God; but 
a heavenly body is regarded as animated and alive according to the philoso-
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phers” (De pot. 3.11 ad 13). Here we do find Thomas replying to an objection 
motivated by something like the principle of proportionate causality by 
noting that although a heavenly body is not alive, the separate substance in 
whose power it acts is alive. The dialectical character of his reply is rather 
clear, given that he cites what he takes to be Aristotle’s opinion—that the 
heavenly bodies are in fact animated—as an alternative reply that would 
satisfy the objector, and he does not commit here to whether it is the divine 
agent or a created separate substance that moves the heavenly bodies.
In any event, there is no question in Thomas’s mind that the divine cause 
must be intelligent and living, and that God is known to be so on the basis 
of the presence of such pure perfections in creatures: Thomas is absolutely 
clear that all perfections must be found preeminently in the first cause. The 
objector is right to hold that what is living cannot be generated without the 
agency of something that is living; the question is whether the created agent 
possessing the proper power through which generation is caused must itself 
be living. St. Thomas’s reply is that it suffices to answer the concern of the 
objector that some principal agent be living; but this has to be maintained 
along with the claim that the celestial body is an instrument without which 
a created separate substance could not generate a living thing.
The reply to the fourteenth objection and counter-objection is in this 
respect illuminating with regard to the causal relationship between a created 
separate mover and the heavenly bodies in the generation of living things:
The power of the living substance moving [the heavenly body] remains in 
the heavenly body and its motion not as a form having complete existence 
in a nature, but in the mode of an intention, just as the power of art is in the 
instrument of the artisan.15
15 De pot. 3.11 ad 14 [Marietti 75]: “Ad decimumquartum dicendum, quod virtus substantiae 
virtualis moventis relinquitur in corpore caelesti et motu eius, non sicut forma habens 
esse completum in natura, sed per modum intentionis, sicut virtus artis est in instru-
mento artificis.” The Parma edition (1859) has spiritualis in place of virtualis, which would 
make better sense; I have opted to read virtualis here as vitalis.
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I would suggest that Thomas’s comparison between the agency of 
a human artisan using an instrument to produce an artifact and the agency 
of a separate substance moving a heavenly body in order to generate living 
things is quite exact, particularly if we think about a case in which human 
artistry produces a substantial change through the use of the natural powers 
of some instrument.
Let us take the case of a baker producing bread through a fire in an oven. 
St. Thomas explicitly maintains that bread is a substance, that the form of 
bread is a substantial form. In replying to an objection (in his discussion of 
transubstantiation) against the status of bread as a substance appealing to 
the fact that bread is an artifact, St. Thomas replies that “nothing prohibits 
something being made by art whose form is not an accident but a substantial 
form,” offering as a perhaps surprising example that frogs and snakes can be 
produced by art.16 So, on Thomas’s view, in the case of the baking of bread, 
we have a substance that is produced by a human artisan, using the natural 
power of fire as an instrument (In Sent. 4.11.1.1 qc. 3 ad 3).
Although there is no natural process ordered per se towards the gen-
eration of bread, bread is produced per se by a baker, who uses the natural 
power of fire to heat the appropriate mixture of blended constituents in 
order to generate bread. Nothing would preclude bread being produced per 
accidens within nature: if wheat happened to be ground by falling stones into 
flour, which happened to be moistened by light rain into dough, which then 
happened to be heated by a brushfire (as improbable as the conjunction of 
16 ST 3.75.6 ad 1. In addition, St. Thomas refers to the “substantial form of bread” in the body 
of this article. As for frogs and snakes generated by art, St. Thomas makes clear elsewhere 
that he has in the mind the art practiced by magicians, such as those of Pharaoh, and that 
this art involves the cooperation of demons. For texts concerning the generation of frogs 
by such an art, see SCG 3.104, ST 1.114.4 ad 2, ST 2–2.178.1 ad 2, De malo 16.9 ad 10. In 
any case, St. Thomas is clear that the magician and the demon make use of the powers of 
nature for the production of frogs, which St. Thomas includes among kinds that can be 
spontaneously generated (see ST 1.114.4 ad 2). For recent discussion of the status of bread 
as a substance in Thomas’s thought, see Michael Rota, “Substance and Artifact in Thomas 
Aquinas,” History of Philosophy Quarterly 21.3 (2004): 241–59; Christopher Brown, “Ar-
tifacts, Substances, and Transubstantiation: Solving a Puzzle for Aquinas’s Views,” The 
Thomist 71.1 (2007): 89–112; Anna Marmodoro and Ben Page, ““Aquinas on Forms, Sub-
stances, and Artifacts,” Vivarium 54.1 (2016): 1–21.
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these events might be), then bread would be naturally produced per accidens. 
But the preparation of dough as matter and the efficient causality of fire are 
intentionally ordered by a human baker, who intends bread as an effect and 
is a per se cause of the generation of bread. This is an instance in which the 
instrument augments the power of the principal agent, as the baker needs 
the oven in order to make the bread.
The causal relationship between (i) the baker, (ii) the fire in the oven, 
and (iii) the bread produced is in most important respects equivalent to the 
causal relationship between (i) a created immaterial mover, (ii) the heavenly 
body, and (iii) a living thing spontaneously generated in the sublunary. Just 
as the baker cannot produce the form of bread except through fire, for St. 
Thomas created separate substances are unable to directly cause any formal 
transmutation of bodily substances; they are limited to causing changes of 
place. If a separate substance wishes to cause any transmutation of a bodily 
substance, it must use a mediating body, “just as a man can heat something 
through fire” (De malo 16.9). Just as the baker is the per se cause of the bread 
because he knows and intends the effect and employs fire as an instrument 
to bring about this effect, so the separate substance that causes the rotary 
locomotion of the heavenly sphere intends the generation of living things 
and employs the heavenly body as its instrument in the production of this 
effect. And just as, however improbable it might be, bread could in principle 
be produced in nature per accidens, so too I would suggest that in Thomas’s 
cosmology if (per impossibile) there were any way for the heavens to undergo 
their circular rotation other than by the agency of separate movers, then the 
heavens would cause corruptions and generations, including spontaneous 
generations, in the sublunary.
That is, there is nothing in Thomas’s account of the role of created 
separate substances as intelligent principal agents whose instruments 
are the heavenly bodies that would suggest that the natural power of the 
celestial body for causing generation in the sublunary in any way depends 
upon the intellectual or volitional acts of the separate substance, any 
more than the power of fire to generate bread from flour depends upon the 
baker’s intellectual or volitional acts. The power of the fire and the power 
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of the celestial body are only moved to produce bread and living things as 
per se effects by an intelligent principal agent, but in neither case does the 
intelligent principal agent give the power for generation to the instrument. 
Again, both the oven and the heavenly body augment the powers of their 
created principal agents.
If this account of the causal relationship between a created separate 
substance and an animal generated in the sublunary is correct, then St. 
Thomas’s reply to the objection motivated by the principle of proportionate 
causality need not undercut what I have argued above. Even if St. Thomas 
is willing to grant that some principal agent—whether this be a created 
immaterial mover or God—must be living in order for something living 
to be generated, it nevertheless remains that the heavenly body, which is 
not itself living, is for St. Thomas the agent with the natural power able to 
educe the forms of spontaneously generated animals and able, through the 
instrumentality of animals within the sublunary, to bring about reproduction 
within a species.
7. Concluding remarks
As I have noted above, although he places restrictions on which living things 
can arise by chance from the activity of ambient vital heat, Thomas sees no 
difficulty in general about spontaneously produced organisms going on to 
reproduce in turn. As we have also seen in Thomas and Aristotle’s discussion 
of the mule, there is no prohibition against two animals reproducing in 
such a way that what results from them is something different in species 
from either of the parents; and the sterility of the mule is not, for Aristotle, 
a consequence of its being a hybrid. It should be clear that such claims, taken 
together, might provide grounds for optimism about the reconcilability of 
Thomistic philosophy with biological evolution. Furthermore, as we have 
seen, the only general metaphysical principle that St. Thomas invokes in 
order to argue for the need for the instrumental contribution of a univocal 
generator is not the principle of proportionate causality, but instead the 
principle that a remote created universal cause needs the instrumental 
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contribution of mediating instruments to produce more powerful effects. 
This principle seems reconcilable with evolution as well—although to 
articulate this reconciliation would require much further work.
If it is the case that metaphysical principles like the principle that effects 
cannot exceed their causes can only be understood in their concrete applica-
tion in Aristotle and Thomas’s thought in terms of some of the details of their 
biology and cosmology, then we should exercise due caution when bringing 
such principles to bear in thinking through problems posed by contemporary 
biology, chemistry, and physics. The preceding has been offered in the hope 
of giving some flesh and bones to the somewhat abstract metaphysical 
claims that the potential is preceded by the actual, that whatever is in the 
effect must first be virtually in the cause, as these claims were understood 
by Aristotle and Thomas. To understand these metaphysical principles as 
Aristotle and Thomas think about them requires that one think through the 
causal claims involved in their physics and biology. No principle in Aristotle 
or Thomas about “the perfect not arising from the imperfect” precludes the 
generation of new kinds of living things by chance. The requirement for 
univocal generators for higher animals is not a consequence of a metaphys-
ical principle about proportionate causality; it is grounded more in physical 
and biological views about the difference between ambient vital heat and 
the structured heating performed by semen. If there were some disposed 
matter which could be acted upon in the necessary way by some physical 
agent other than sperm concocted from the blood of a male horse, there 
would be for Thomas no metaphysical prohibition against a horse arising by 
chance. Whether an account of reproduction grounded in biochemistry and 
genetics makes more room than the account grounded in the Aristotelian 
elemental theory for the per accidens generation of new species that go on 
to reproduce in kind is a question for the biologist: metaphysics does not 
preclude an affirmative answer.
My presentation of Thomas’s understanding of the proportionate 
causes of living species invites questions about how one might adapt his 
views to contemporary cosmology and biology. For example, can we identify 
anything that plays something like the role played by the sun in his account, 
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as a physical, universal, per se cause of generated living things? It is not my 
intention here to answer this question or the related question of whether 
Thomas’s views can be reasonably adapted to fit an account which denies 
that there is any such physical universal cause. Given what I have tried to 
establish in this brief study, however, it should be clear that if we construct 
an account in which the role of the celestial bodies is removed and living 
things are identified as principal per se causes of their offspring, we have 
already significantly modified Thomas’s views concerning the proportionate 
causes of living things.
Finally, I would emphasize that it is no accident that the matters 
of spontaneous generation and of the generation of the mule through 
hybridization are discussed by Aristotle in Metaphysics 7 and by Thomas’s 
commentary on that work, in their argumentation against the need for 
Platonic separate forms as principles of generation. Their purpose is to 
show that causes which they identify in the natural world—the reproducing 
animals, even if they are of different species, the sun and the heat that it 
causes—are adequate for explaining the generation of all living things. In an 
Aristotelian cosmos, the active powers for the generation of living kinds are 
the powers of physical agents. In many recent discussions of how to possibly 
reconcile Thomistic metaphysics with biological evolution, contemporary 
authors have made direct recourse to the causality of the divine agent, who 
would be able to infuse the form of a new species into the first member of 
a new kind whenever the matter apt for that form has arisen by chance. 
Perhaps this is the metaphysical conclusion at which one needs to arrive; 
but if so, we will have left Aristotelian or Thomistic metaphysics behind 
on one of its central conclusions about natural substances. It is ironic, but 
understandable, that some have been led to do this, from a version of the 
“principle of proportionate causality” derived from the very discussion in 
which Aristotle and Thomas have argued against Plato. But perhaps we 
should, instead, be optimistic with Thomas that it pertains to the goodness 
of the divine to endow creation with the power to act as a genuine cause of 
anything moved or generated.
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Abbreviations for the works of St. Thomas Aquinas
Comp. theo. Compendium theologiae
De pot. Quaestiones disputatae de potentia Dei
De spir. creat. Quaestiones disputatae de spiritualibus creaturis
De sub. sep. De substantiis separatis
De ver. Quaestiones disputatae de veritate
In Meta. In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio
In Phys. Commentaria in octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis
In Sent. Scriptum Super Sententiis Magistri Petri Lombardi
Quodl. Quaestiones quodlibetales
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